Africa’s long-running struggle to balance food self-sufficiency with economic openness is becoming more pronounced as many countries pivot away from traditional partners in the United States and Europe toward alternative bilateral relationships with Russia, China, and other Global South actors. While these shifts are often framed as strategic diversification, they risk entrenching a new form of import dependency rather than strengthening domestic agricultural production.
Across much of the continent, policy frameworks aimed at import substitution coexist uneasily with trade structures that remain heavily import-centric. This contradiction undermines local production, weakens value-chain development, and diverts scarce public resources away from investments that could support farmers, agro-processing, and rural employment. The paradox is striking: Africa possesses vast arable land and a young labour force, yet continues to rely on food imports to meet basic demand.
Ghana offers a revealing case study. Despite ambitious policy rhetoric and renewed emphasis on domestic production, the country remains heavily dependent on imported staples. Ghana spends an estimated US$3 billion annually on food imports, including wheat, rice, sugar, fish, and poultry—an outflow that strains foreign exchange reserves and constrains local industry.
In December 2025, Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama reaffirmed the need to transform agriculture into a driver of food security, employment, and economic growth. Speaking during Agricultural Day celebrations, he urged citizens to take up farming and underscored the importance of affordable credit, modern inputs, and state support. His administration’s broader policy agenda—including the 24-Hour Economy, the Big Push, and Grow 24 initiatives—places agricultural modernisation at its core.
Yet, despite these policy signals, Ghana’s import dependence has not eased. Instead, the country has increasingly turned to Russia as a major supplier of poultry, wheat, vegetable oils, fish, dairy products, and other food items. Russian poultry—particularly frozen chicken cuts—now accounts for a significant share of Ghana’s imports, filling a production gap that domestic farmers are unable to meet.
Trade data and official acknowledgements from Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture confirm that Russian exports resumed after the lifting of a temporary avian influenza ban in 2021. Since then, imports have expanded under bilateral arrangements that reflect strong demand rather than strategic industrial planning. Ghana is not alone: Russia has steadily increased agricultural exports to Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and other African markets.
This trend highlights a broader structural dilemma. While import bans or restrictions may signal political commitment to self-reliance, insufficient investment in productivity, infrastructure, extension services, and agro-processing leaves domestic producers unable to compete. The result is a cycle in which imports remain essential to meet demand, even as governments proclaim self-sufficiency goals.
Russia, for its part, views Africa as a strategic growth market. Following successive Russia–Africa summits, Moscow has pledged to expand exports of grain, poultry, fertilisers, and other agricultural products to the continent. At a May 2025 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia’s Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov noted that more than 40 Russian companies were actively seeking to export agricultural goods to Africa.
According to Ilya Ilyushin, head of Russia’s Agroexport Federal Center, agricultural exports to Africa have more than doubled, reaching nearly US$7 billion by the third quarter of 2025. Major grain buyers include Egypt, Algeria, Kenya, Libya, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, and Sudan, with plans to expand further into West Africa and the Sahel.
From Russia’s perspective, this expansion represents both economic opportunity and geopolitical influence, with estimates suggesting annual export revenues to Africa could exceed US$15 billion. For African countries, however, the growing reliance on external suppliers raises a fundamental question: can food security be achieved without building strong domestic production systems?
The challenge is not trade itself, but imbalance. Imports can complement local supply during periods of shortfall, but sustained dependence erodes incentives to invest in productivity, value addition, and rural industrialisation. No country has achieved long-term food security or middle-income status without first modernising its agricultural base.
As Africa navigates a more fragmented global trade environment, policymakers face a critical choice. Partnerships—whether with traditional allies or new ones—must support, not substitute, domestic agricultural transformation. Without deliberate investment in local production, agro-processing, and technology, the continent risks replacing one dependency with another.
Ultimately, food sovereignty cannot be secured through imports alone. Africa’s economic future depends on converting its natural and human resources into productive, competitive agricultural systems—capable of feeding its population, supporting industry, and reducing vulnerability to external shocks.